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Po l i c y  Re s e a R c h Wo R k i n g  Pa P e R 4627
Trade can be a key driver of growth for African 
countries, as it has been for those countries, particularly 
in East Asia, that have experienced high and sustained 
rates of growth. Economic partnership agreements 
with the European Union could be instrumental in a 
competitiveness framework, but to do so they would 
have to be designed carefully in a way that supports 
integration into the global economy and is consistent 
with national development strategies. Interim agreements 
have focused on reciprocal tariff removal and less 
restrictive rules of origin. To be fully effective, economic 
partnership agreements will have to address constraints 
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to regional integration, including both tariff and non-
tariff barriers; improve trade facilitation; and define 
appropriate most favored nation services liberalization. 
At the same time, African countries will need to reduce 
external tariff peak barriers on a most favored nation basis 
to ensure that when preferences for the European Union 
are implemented after transitional periods, they do not 
lead to substantial losses from trade diversion. This 
entails an ambitious agenda of policy reform that must be 
backed up by development assistance in the form of “aid 
for trade.”  
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  11. Introduction 
Trade has been a key driver of growth in countries that have been successful in achieving 
high rates of growth over the past three decades, such as those in East Asia. If they are to 
accelerate their growth, trade will have to perform the same role for African countries.  
Designing policies that promote trade and trade competitiveness must therefore be at the 
heart of growth strategies for African countries.  
 
Economic partnership agreements (EPAs) with the EU could be instrumental in a 
competitiveness framework, but to do so they have to be designed carefully.  Any 
successful EPA will need to take into account critical features of the new global economy:   
•  intense new competition emanating from large developing countries such as China, 
India and Brazil;  
•  simultaneous  rapid growth of these economies opening up new dynamic market 
opportunities; 
•  explosive growth of services trade, creating new opportunities in the global market 
and offering new avenues for diversification away from primary commodities;   
•  the increasing importance of domestic institutions, policies and infrastructure in 
affecting productivity and the ability of a country’s firms to compete in 
international market.  
   
In this new global context, the EPAs create an opportunity to undertake domestic reforms 
that support global competitiveness. A broad template for such reforms would include (i) 
reforms that improve the incentive framework especially by reducing tariff and non-tariff 
barriers to remove bias against exporting, (ii) increase access to and lower the costs of 
backbone services, such as telecoms, transport, energy and finance and (iii) address non-
tariff barriers and weak trade supporting institutions, including standards, customs, and 
trade promotion agencies and design effective mechanisms to assist the restructuring of 
domestic firms with the potential to be globally competitive. 
 
The EU can contribute by helping to design and support African countries in effectively 
implementing the provisions of a pro-development EPA. In this context “Aid for trade” 
associated with EPAs (and the multilateral discussions) can help build infrastructure and 
the institutional capacity that is necessary to remove NTBs, facilitate trade, regulate 
services and support trade promotion and firm restructuring. The first order of business is 
to reduce barriers to regional integration and allow African firms the opportunity to exploit 
nearby markets as a springboard to the global market. Typically these barriers also directly 
limit access to the global market. EPAs can play an important role in leveraging coherent 
regional reforms and in putting in place mechanisms that allow for coordinated 
development support from EU countries. The priority of delivering effective regional 
integration was recognized in the initial objectives of the EPA negotiations and was 
strongly identified as such by the EU Trade Commissioner in several speeches.  
 
In a context of wanting to have in place WTO consistent agreements when the Cotonou 
Agreement expired, the EU pushed hard in 2007 to define interim agreements that focus 
  2primarily on reciprocal tariff reductions to satisfy GATT Article XXIV requirements.
2 The 
interim agreements also include an important relaxation of the rules of origin for certain 
products, but especially clothing, which had previously restricted preferential access to the 
EU market for African exporters. A number of African countries signed these interim 
agreements either collectively (as with the EAC) or individually. Other countries are 
expected to sign shortly, while other countries such as Senegal and Nigeria have been 
strongly critical of the interim agreements and have expressed reluctance to signing.  
 
If EPAs are to realize their development potential, it is important that these interim 
agreements do not become de facto EPAs -- otherwise the opportunity for such agreements 
to address constraints to competitiveness and integration into global markets and to be a 
key mechanism in supporting development in Africa will be lost. Bilateral reductions of 
tariffs is unlikely to be effective in driving rapid growth to the extent they leverage only 
minimally the domestic and regional reforms that are necessary to overcome the barriers 
that limit integration into the global economy. Many African countries have seen a very 
weak supply response to preferences in the past and this is unlikely to change unless these 
supply constraints are ameliorated. Worse, there is a real risk that removal of tariffs against 
the EU without broader tariff reform and in the presence of substantial NTBs to regional 
trade will lead to economic losses for African countries. Further, there are real concerns 
that the current patchwork of agreements will undermine regional integration. With the 
exception of the EAC, countries in the same regional bloc have signed agreements with the 
EU that have different product exclusion lists which will necessitate strict controls on the 
movement of EU products within regional groupings to ensure that a product exclusion in 
one country is not undermined by preferences for the same product in a partner country.
3  
 
The EU Commission has asserted that these WTO-consistent market access agreements 
will be a stepping stone to deeper agreements in the future. However, whether the second 
stage of such a process will actually materialize remains to be seen as African countries 
may well lose the bargaining power domestically to obtain progress on competitiveness 
issues that came from market access concessions.
4  
 
This paper elaborates on ways EPAs could be designed to drive growth through effective 
regional integration and integration into the global market. A first section highlights the 
trade challenge that African countries face and makes the point that preferences have not 
been effective in preventing the substantial decline in world market share of African 
countries. A second section describes opportunities that the new wave of globalization is 
opening up to African countries. A third section briefly discusses what this means in terms 
of a strategy to attain global competitiveness and suggests design features of an EPA that 
would complement and support competitiveness reform programs.  
 
                                                 
2 These require that the parties to a free trade agreement remove tariffs on “substantially all” (interpreted by 
the EU to mean 80% of mutual trade) trade under a defined and reasonable timetable. 
3 See, Stevens et al (2008) 
4 See, for example, Francesco Rampa, “Love is blind”? A two-stage agreement risks being an ‘EPA tight’ 
rather than an ‘EPA light’, ECPDM, http://www.acp-eu-trade.org/library/files/Rampa_EN_1107_ECDPM-
ICTSD_Love-is-blind-A-two-stage-agreem%E2%80%A6.pdf  
  32. The trade challenge facing African countries 
The trade preferences that have been granted to the ACP countries by the European 
Communities under the Yaoundé, Lomé, and Cotonou Agreements for the last 30 years 
will expire in 2008. Negotiations for a new WTO consistent trade agreement have been 
taking place for the last 5 years. To limit the demands of negotiating agreements with each 
ACP country the EU has pursued negotiations to establish six Free Trade Areas (FTAs). 
To date, negotiations have advanced only slowly and there is considerable debate as to 
how EPAs should be designed and what elements and commitments they should contain. 
Before proceeding to these issues it is important to reflect upon the impact of current and 
previous EU development agreements.   
 
We focus our description of past trends on Eastern and Southern Africa (the ESA-region in 
the EPA negotiations). The trade challenges that we highlight for ESA are probably 
broadly similar to those facing most of the other EPA regions.  
 
The average share of global merchandise exports of the ESA countries was small 25 years 
ago -- but has by now fallen to half its original level (Figure 1).  Most of the decline 
occurred in the 1980s with a leveling off in the 1990s but little subsequent rebound. The 
performance of the average ESA country stands in stark comparison with the average of a 
group of 16 fast growing countries
5. It is the trade and growth performance of these 
countries that African countries will have to replicate over the next 20 years if the targets 
that they have set for poverty reduction are to be achieved. On average, the fast-growing 
countries of the past two decades have seen their share of global exports rise rapidly (a 3-
fold increase over the past 25 years), fuelling the sustained growth that these countries 
have enjoyed. The figure highlights the importance of trade for the fast growing countries 
and shows the lacklustre export performance of the average country in the ESA region. 
Given the small (economic) size of most countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, the role that 
trade can play for the achievement of robust and sustained economic growth is particularly 
important. The figure indicates the enormous potential for sustained growth of exports 
from the ESA region.  
 
                                                 
5 This group contains non-oil exporting countries that have grown at an average annual rate of growth of 4.5 
per cent of more over the past 25 years. The averages are unweighted so that country size does not influence 
the measure. The sixteen countries are Botswana, Sri Lanka, Chile, Indonesia, Pakistan, Mauritius, Uganda, 
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Source: Bank staff calculations, based on data from IMF World Economic Outlook, Ethiopia and Eritrea counted as one country
 
 
Figure 2 shows a similar story for exports of services. The average ESA country has had a 
very low and declining share of the global market for services. This is in contrast to the 
fast growing countries, which have, on average, almost tripled their share of the world 
market over the past 25 years. Hence, the challenge for ESA and other ACP countries is to 
provide a trade policy climate in which to attain the sustained increases in exports of both 
goods and services and rising global market shares that have driven growth in the high 
performing countries.    
 
These figures also suggest a lack of effectiveness of current and previous agreements with 
the EU in supporting sustained growth of exports or in dealing with the constraints that 
have undermined the share of ESA countries in the world market. In other words, this 
weak performance occurred despite preferential access to the EU and other markets. 
Preferences alone have not helped to strongly integrate ESA into the global economy. With 
decreasing margins of preference due to continued multilateral liberalization, they are even 
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There are three key reasons why preferences have not been effective in stimulating a 
significant export response in ACP countries.
6 First, preferences have not dealt with, and 
may have distracted attention away from, the key supply side constraints that limit access 
to all markets. Brenton and Hoppe (2007), for example, find that whilst preferences for 
clothing have supported exports to the EU and US they have not overcome the negative 
impact of weak governance in Africa on the sourcing decisions of global buyers. The 
conclusions from a review of the range of diagnostic trade integration studies
7 that have 
been undertaken in least developed countries concludes that the principal constraints to 
trade are typically those that limit access to and raise the costs of the key backbone 
services that are critical for competitiveness (transport and logistics, energy, finance, 
telecommunications). These problems are compounded by poorly designed structures of 
incentives that constrain the flow of resources into their most productive uses and weak 
and ineffectual trade supporting institutions, such as customs, standards, export promotion 
agencies, trade ministries themselves, and the often existing fragmentation of authority 
with regard to trade related issues between a number of ministries, coupled with a lack of 
communication between stakeholders.   
 
Second, and related, preferences margins for many of products currently exported by 
African countries are typically small and have, and will continue, to be eroded, by 
multilateral trade liberalization and the EU’s predilection to sign free trade agreements. It 
should be pointed out that 46 percent of exports from Africa to the EU are concentrated in 
                                                 
6 Ollareaga and Ozden (2005) suggest that preferences may actually have hindered integration of poor 
countries into global markets, showing that those countries that received preferences tended to have 
liberalised their own trade policies less than those developing countries that had not received preferential 
access to OECD markets.  
7 See Biggs (2007) 
  6oil products. Of the remaining non-oil exports, 58 percent enter the EU under a zero MFN 
tariff rate (this percentage is similar for both LDCs and non-LDCs). The value of 
preferences that many in individual ACP countries perceive is often far in excess of reality. 
For example, looking at the 13 non-LDCs which may lose some of their preferential access 
to the EU if they do not sign an EPA and revert to the GSP, the value of preferences under 
Cotonou amounted to only 3.9 percent of their exports to the EU or EUR 782 million in 
2005.
8 The value of EU preferences for African LDCs is less at 2.1 percent of their exports 
to the EU.
9  (The appendix provides a more detailed discussion of the value of EU 
preferences under Cotonou and the GSP.) 
 
Third, for products where margins of preference have been substantial, such as clothing, 
market access has been severely limited by restrictive rules of origin imposed by the EU. 
Prior to the end of the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing, exports of apparel from 
African least developed countries (LDCs) to the EU stagnated despite preferences, whilst 
exports to the US under AGOA grew very strongly (Figure 3). Exports of apparel from 
African LDCs to the EU and US were almost equal in 2000, but the value of exports to the 
US in 2004 was almost four times greater than the value of exports to the EU.  
 
Source: USITC and Eurostat 
 
The key factor explaining why exports to the US grew much faster than to the EU is the 
rules of origin. EU rules stipulated production from yarn. This entails that a double 
transformation process must take place in the beneficiary with the yarn being woven into 
fabric and then the fabric cut and made-up into apparel. These rules prohibit the use of 
imported fabric, although cumulation provisions allow for the use of inputs produced in the 
                                                 
8 Under the GSP the value of their preferences would fall to 0.5 percent of their exports or EUR 103 million, 
a loss of EUR 679.  
9 The value of ACP/GSP preferences for all African countries (excluding South Africa) equals 2.6 (3.3) 
percent of their respective exports. South Africa accounts for about a third of all SSA exports to the EU. 
  7EU and other ACP countries. To obtain preferences, apparel producers had to use local, 
EU or ACP fabrics.  They could not use fabrics from the main fabric-producing countries 
in Asia and still qualify for EU preferences—a binding restriction, since few countries in 
Africa have competitive fabric industries.  
 
Until the recent EPA agreements, the EU rules did not allow producers in low-income 
African countries the flexibility they currently have had under AGOA to source fabrics 
globally. It is worth remembering that the EU granted preferences to African countries for 
apparel subject to these strict rules of origin for more than 20 years under the Lome and 
then Cotonou agreements. However, these strict rules did little to encourage the 
development of an efficient fabric industry in Africa, the main justification for their 
imposition,
10 and are likely to have severely constrained the impact of preferences in 
stimulating the clothing industry.
11 This is because a competitive and thriving clothing 
sector is the most important driver for a local textile industry. By limiting the ability of the 
clothing firms in Africa to source inputs globally, EU rules undermined the 
competitiveness of the sector and additionally compromised opportunities for the 
emergence of efficient textile firms. At the same time, the lack of regional infrastructure 
and market size for textile products have hindered the exploitation of economies of scale 
and scope in competitively producing high quality textiles and specialized textile products. 
An important aspect of the interim agreements that have been signed is that these rules for 
clothing have been relaxed to allow for a single transformation requirement similar to that 
under AGOA. 
 
3. Opportunities and Challenges in the Changing Global Economy 
The negotiation of EPAs is taking place in a rapidly changing world economy. EPAs will 
be successful if they leverage the reforms and supporting aid for trade that are essential if  
African countries are to exploit the opportunities that are available to them in the global 
market whilst effectively addressing the challenges that come from an increasingly 
competitive global economy. Opening domestic markets to EU firms driven by the 
perceived need to lock-in access to the EU for preference dependent exports will not be a 
recipe for success. This section briefly discusses the emerging opportunities for ACP 
countries in the world economy, with a focus on Africa. It highlights the growing 
importance of East Asia in the global economy and the surge in trade in services that has 
accompanied declining telecommunications costs. 
 
3.1 The rising importance of developing countries in the global economy 
The pace of global integration is likely to intensify and will be powered increasingly by 
developing countries. World Bank (2006) suggests that the size of the global economy will 
rise from $35 trillion in 2005 to $72 trillion (at constant market exchange rates and prices) 
in 2030, an average annual increase of more than 3 percent—2.5 percent for high-income 
countries and 4.2 percent for developing countries. Developing countries, once considered 
the periphery of the global economy, will become main drivers. The share of developing 
                                                 
10 See Brenton (2006) for a discussion of why restrictive rules of origin are inappropriate as a development 
tool and are more likely to reflect protectionist interests in the preference granting country. 
11 See Brenton and Ozden (2005) for a more detailed analysis of the impact of the EBA and AGOA on 
apparel exports from African LDCs and the role of the rules of origin.  
  8countries in global output will increase steadily and China’s output will exceed that of the 
European Union and that of the United States sometime around 2015 (in purchasing power 
parity terms). Global integration is likely to enter a new phase. In virtually every growing 
economy the importance of trade—captured by the ratio of trade to GDP—will rise, 
continuing the trend of the past two decades.  
 
Global trade in goods and services, growing faster than output, is likely to rise more than 
threefold to $27 trillion in 2030. Roughly half that increase will come through developing 
countries, with the share of developing countries in global exports rising from 32 percent 
now to 45 percent in 2030 (Figure 4). This means that a growing share of global 
production of goods and services will be performed in those developing countries able to 
take advantage of new opportunities and respond to the emerging challenges. Whether 
countries exceed projections—or fall short—depends heavily on the policies they adopt 
over this long period.  
 
Figure 4: Developing countries share of world trade will rise as Figure 4: Developing countries share of world trade will rise as global  global 










Source: World Bank Global Economic Prospects 2007 Source: World Bank Global Economic Prospects 2007











The new wave of globalization brings important challenges for developing countries. 
Developing countries with wages higher than those in China and India risk losing ground 
following the entry of these countries into the global marketplace. The sheer size of China 
and India may also preclude the diversification of the poorest countries into manufactures 
and so close of a route to growth and development (Cline (2006)). However, what matters 
is productivity. In middle income countries is the wage gap with China greater than the 
difference in productivity and can productivity differentials be maintained? Similarly, least 
developed countries in Africa that have lower wages than China and India, will be able to 
compete in the global market if levels of productivity are close to those in India and China.  
 
  9Another problem with the view that the global market will be swamped by products from 
China and India is that the law of comparative advantage entails that there will always be 
opportunities for other countries to export even though India and China will come to 
dominate certain sectors. In general, as the global demand for say Chinese manufactured 
products increases, (dollar denominated) wages in China will tend to increase, through 
higher wage demands from Chinese workers (especially if the rural and urban labor 
markets remain partially segmented) and from the inevitable additional pressure on the 
yuan to rise. There is evidence that this process has already begun (Figure 5). 
 
Figure 5: China Figure 5: China’ ’s surge  s surge – – and that of other developing countries  and that of other developing countries – –
represents more opportunity than threat represents more opportunity than threat
  Exporting requires importing Exporting requires importing
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 Thus, Chinese development will not preclude the lowest income countries being able to 
export low skilled intensive products. However, this will only arise if these countries put in 
place a business climate that supports investment and trade. For example, in Africa, 
competitiveness from low cost labor is undermined by high indirect costs, with the main 
barriers being corruption, crime and inadequate infrastructure (Eifert et al 2005). The poor 
business environment leads to lower returns to labor and capital in production which 
depresses investment, labor demand and real wages.  
 
The entry of these large economic entities into the global market offers opportunities as 
enormous as the challenges posed for developing countries. The large markets in India and 
China have changed the dynamic of south-south trade (Figure 6) and offer developing 
countries a route to decreased dependence on rich countries, demand in which for products 
produced in the poorest countries has been growing slowly for a long period.  
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Nevertheless, at the beginning of the 21
st century, African countries still ship nearly two 
thirds of their total exports to EU and the US. There has been, however, a recent shift in 
export patterns. Demand in Asia, and primarily in India and China, has been the main 
source of the accelerated growth of African exports since 1990 and the growth of such 
exports has intensified in the 2000s (Broadman (2007)).  
 
Table 1: Destination of Sub-Saharan (non-oil) Exports 
Destination 2004 2030
Asia    18.3% 31.3%
Eastern Europe and Central Asia  8.2% 8.6%
European Union  53.3% 38.7%
The Americas  8.0% 5.7%
        o.w. USA  6.2% 4.3%
        o.w. Brazil  0.3% 0.2%
Middle East, North Africa  2.0% 2.5%
Oceania  0.3% 0.2%
Sub-Saharan Africa  9.9% 12.9%
Total  100.0% 100.0%
source: Linkage model, COMTRADE, own calculations; non-oil trade only 
 
In table 1 we show, using a very simple simulation based on the gravity model and 
scenarios of growth in the different regions drawn from Global Economic Prospects 2007, 
that the importance of China and other East Asian countries as a destination for Africa’s 
  11exports should increase substantially over the next 25 years
12. The main adjustment that 
takes place is a shift away from Europe. If bilateral trade flows continue to be driven by 
incomes and location then Europe will cease to be the largest destination market for SSA 
exports. Exports to the EU market will remain critical for many exporters and important 
new markets and niches will clearly arise. However, if EPAs are narrowly focused on 
bilateral trade between the EU and sub-Saharan Africa and fail to address the key 
constraints to global competitiveness then they will fail to assist the ACP countries in 
exploiting these new opportunities in the global market.  
 
3.2 Opportunities from the Global Sourcing of Services 
The global competition that has been underway in goods for decades is now visible in 
services, as falling telecommunications costs and greater openness to FDI enable different 
parts of the services value chain to be performed in different locations around the globe—
global sourcing of services.  Global sourcing has increased competition in services markets 
for a wide variety of activities, from low-skilled such as data entry, word processing and 
call centers to higher skilled activities such as software development, consultancy, medical 
services and R&D. A range of services that were previously thought to be non-tradable are 
now being provided electronically over large distances. The potential number of service 
jobs that may migrate from rich to poor countries is uncertain but could be large (World 
Bank (2006)). 
 
This phenomenon is creating considerable opportunities for development in poor low wage 
countries, both in terms of export possibilities as well as access through imports to cheaper 
services inputs that raise productivity when used in other sectors. Global sourcing is 
providing important new employment. In the relatively low-value segments such as call 
centers, wage costs are important determinants of location (along with language skills) and 
competition is fierce among developing countries. At the higher skill end, global sourcing 
of services may be reducing incentives for skilled migration by creating new opportunities 
at home. It is also important to note that a large number of those employed as a result of 
global sourcing are women, offering a different route to development than that based on 
growth of agriculture and manufacturing. 
 
The services revolution and global sourcing are offering opportunities for new exports and 
for attracting services-related foreign investment for a range of poor countries. IT and 
global sourcing offer new and alternative drivers of development that circumvent some of 
the key constraints to growth driven by the expansion of exports of agricultural and 
manufactured goods. This is most apparent for landlocked countries and small (often 
island) economies that face very high costs for physical transportation (by air, road and 
sea). For example, development in Rwanda has to confront an extremely adverse location, 
one of the highest population densities and a high population growth rate. While increasing 
the quality of quantity of exports of traditional agricultural exports (coffee) and minerals is 
crucial to increases in incomes for the poor in the short to medium term, the government of 
Rwanda has identified the provision of IT intensive services, both locally and abroad, as a 
                                                 
12 The growth rates for each region are based on simple projections of average performance over the past 15  
years. The approach is based on simply applying the coefficients on exporter and importer GDP from a 
standard gravity model to the changes in income over the next 25 years.  
  12base for growth in the long run, to provide for employment and to turn the country’s high, 
but very young, population into a driver of development rather than a constraint. While 
India and China will come to dominate the market for global sourcing of services, 
comparative advantage will ensure that there are opportunities for many developing 
countries. Small island economies in the Caribbean, for example, have been able to attract 
certain back office activities from the United States, such as data entry.  
 
While there are important new opportunities for developing countries there are also 
considerable challenges regarding the provision of necessary infrastructure, the design and 
implementation of appropriate regulation and effective education strategies to increase the 
supply of human capital. While telecommunications infrastructure is clearly crucial, access 
to relatively cheap and reliable electricity is also necessary (a critical problem for many 
poor countries). Providing access to high-quality telecommunications infrastructure is not 
sufficient. It is also necessary to establish a competitive framework for the provision of 
telecommunications services. Liberalization of the trade and investment regime can be 
central to ensuring the efficient and competitive provision of the backbone 
telecommunications services complemented by an appropriate and effective regulatory 
environment. Considering the difficulties in establishing such a framework, it is in this 
sector that Aid for Trade and technical assistance, similar to the concept of “twinning”, are 
needed. This concept has been used very successfully in EU accession countries where 
administrations and agencies of member and accession countries exchanged personnel to 
transfer knowledge and procedures. 
 
4. Trade and Competitiveness Reform Programs 
It is important that developing countries make trade central to their development strategies 
to enable them to exploit the opportunities that global integration offers to attain and 
sustain high rates of growth. This calls for more attention to policies that facilitate trade 
and improve competitiveness – supported where necessary by Aid for Trade. In this 
context it is useful to have a framework in which to assess the range of issues that affect 
countries’ ability to compete in international markets. Experience suggests that a practical 




1. The incentives regime. A key challenge for policy makers is to ensure that domestic 
resources are channeled to their most productive activities. This requires a careful analysis 
of the structure of incentives in the economy to ensure that land, labor, capital and 
technology are moving to a) sectors in which the country has a long-term capacity to 
compete and b) to the most productive firms within sectors. In turn, this necessitates a clear 
understanding of how trade, tax, the business environment and labor market policies 
interact to affect investment, output and trade decisions. In many small low income 
countries the economy tends to be dominated by a small number of sectors so that many of 
the key issues regarding the allocation of resources can be unearthed by analysis that 
focuses on these sectors. This method, however, is likely to miss growth potential in 
                                                 
13 For more details see 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/TRADE/EXTEXPCOMNET/0,,contentMDK:212
98368~menuPK:2534115~pagePK:64168427~piPK:64168435~theSitePK:2463594,00.html 
  13sectors that are only on the verge of becoming successful as they do not figure in the policy 
makers’ mindsets. There would hence be a bias towards already established sectors, 
missing the potentially large growth potential in non-traditional sectors. 
 
2. Lowering the costs of backbone services. Of great importance in today’s globalized 
economy is that domestic firms have access to efficiently produced critical backbone 
services inputs. Firms that have to pay more than their competitors for energy, 
telecommunications, customs services, transport and logistics, finance and security will 
find it hard to compete in both the domestic and overseas markets. Competition and 
regulatory oversight in these services industries lie at the heart of the policy challenge. In 
many developing countries lack of infrastructure is a critical constraint on the availability 
and cost of backbone services. Other critical services are those related to education and 
training that are necessary to ensure supply of the type of labor required by the more 
productive expanding sectors in the economy and to foster a process by which value is 
increasingly added to the products and services produced in the country. 
 
3. Pro-active policies to support trade. It is important to address a range of market and 
government failures that tend to afflict countries as they seek to expand exports and 
growth. In many cases these constraints to competitiveness require specific interventions 
and institutions. These are likely to include export and investment promotion agencies, 
standards bodies, agencies to support innovation and clustering. In addition, governments 
will need to address the political economy constraints to reform and to limit the costs of 
adjustment, especially when they fall disproportionately on particular groups. In general, 
such a strategy will be more effective if focused on protecting workers rather than 
protecting jobs (World Bank Global Economic Prospects 2007). This means that effective 
safety nets for those workers losing their jobs due to increased competition should be put 
in place. In tackling government failures and weak capacity for policy formulation and 
implementation, an effective mechanism can be to establish an empowered and dedicated 
trade and competitiveness policy unit within government that brings together stakeholders 
and coordinates policies on export processing zones, duty refund schemes, and other 
initiatives. It is important that these initiatives are brought together within a strategy for 
competitiveness rather than as a series of ad hoc interventions. In isolation these agencies 
tend to be rather weak and ineffective, and by potentially duplicating efforts will most 
likely waste scarce skilled resources. 
 
Export diversification is a critical element in achieving high and sustained growth in 
commodity dependent countries in Africa. This framework for competitiveness will be 
appropriate for supporting diversification. Brenton, Newfarmer and Walkenhorst (2007) 
show that the global economy offers a range of opportunities for diversification: from new 
products, from raising the quality of existing goods, from increasing the penetration of 
overseas markets for existing exports and by exploiting possibilities to export services. 
Successful diversification by definition requires that resources move into new activities 
and are not bottled up in old low productivity operations. This necessitates a neutral set of 
incentives. Export diversification will tend to increase the importance of activities that 
require the more intensive use of backbone services than traditional activities. Exports of 
services rely heavily on the use of other services as inputs. For example, 
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activities. Transport is vital to tourism. Finally, higher quality and differentiated products 
tend to face higher information barriers in accessing overseas markets and are often more 
dependent on institutions such as those relating to testing and certifying quality and 
compliance with standards in overseas markets.   
      
5. The role of EPAs  
At the end of 2007, having fallen short of successfully negotiating full Economic 
Partnership Agreements and given a strict deadline by the EU to sign WTO consistent 
agreements at the point of expiry of the Cotonou Agreement, interim agreements were 
initialed by 19 Africa countries. Most African non-LDCs, with the exception of Nigeria, 
Republic of Congo, Gabon and South Africa, concluded interim agreements. South Africa 
will continue to receive market access in the EU under its TDCA agreement, whilst the 
others will receive access to the EU market according to the GSP and hence loose 
preferences relative to Cotonou. Interim agreements were agreed with the EAC and the 
ESA and SADC groups. No agreement was achieved with Central or West Africa. The 
LDCs in these regions will receive access to the EU under the EBA. The interim 
agreements call for the conclusion of more comprehensive EPAs (indicating but not 
determining some of the issues to be included) “as soon as possible”, meaning by the end 
of 2008. However, ECOWAS has already decided to request an extension of the deadline 
until the end of 2009.   
 
The standard partial equilibrium analysis of the trade and welfare effects of reciprocal 
trade agreements, such as the interim agreements that the EU has signed is presented in 
Milner et al. (2005). Several studies have provided empirical estimates of the impact of 
reciprocal tariff reductions under EPAs on trade, revenues and welfare, for example, 
Karingi et al (2005) and Keck and Piermartini (2008).
14 In this paper, whilst cognizant of 
these impacts, we look at the opportunities of the EPAs in the broader policy objective of 
seeking to increase competitiveness and integrate into the global economy. 
 
One of the fundamental challenges that the EPA process has faced is that the negotiations 
have been undertaken between the EU and the secretariats of regional groupings while to 
be successful, agreements must be consistent with the trade and development strategies of 
individual ACP countries. Trade relations with the EU and regional partners are just one 
element of trade policy that should also encompass unilateral, multilateral and bilateral 
agreements with other countries.  
 
To improve competitiveness, African countries need to invest in significant domestic 
reforms and upgrading of infrastructure. But because many of the African countries are 
small in population and economic size and/or are landlocked, many competitiveness issues 
are best addressed at the regional level. For example, it is important that the interests of 
land-locked countries are properly taken into account in motivating reform of ports, 
customs and transport in the countries that provide access to the global market. EPAs can 
play an important role in strengthening and moving forward the process of regional 
                                                 
14 The ODI has provided a short summary of the main results of empirical studies of the potential impacts of 
EPAs: http://www.odi.org.uk/Publications/briefing/bp_june06_epa_bp2.pdf 
  15integration. Well-designed EPAs offer an opportunity to harness the power of trade 
negotiations to further internal regional development and spur integration into the global 
economy as well as improving access to the EU market and leveraging aid for trade to 
support reform programs. In contrast, a poorly designed EPA could undermine regional 
integration and seriously hinder development (Stevens (2005)). As each negotiating region 
consists of countries with different economic interests and political conditions, the 
challenge for the EU and African countries will be to structure EPAs in a way that offers 
mechanisms and incentives to strengthen the process of regional integration.
15 Box 1 
suggests and summarizes key elements of a pro-development EPA. The interim 
agreements do make some progress in guaranteeing duty and quota free access to the EU 
and in reducing the restrictiveness of the EU’s rules of origin. However, if pro-
development EPAs are to be achieved in 2008 there will have to be substantial progress in 
the other key areas outlines in the box. The following sections briefly elaborate on how 
EPAs can support reform in the three areas that are crucial for global competitiveness.  
 
5.1 The incentive regime 
Reducing the dispersion and then the level of tariffs will be a critical element of a 
competitiveness strategy in many of African countries in terms of reducing the impact of 
distortions in the structure of incentives. Lower external tariffs are necessary to avoid 
potentially damaging trade diversion from the removal of tariffs against EU suppliers in an 
EPA. Trade liberalization in the EPA regions should be a staged process with intra regional 
barriers removed first to ensure effectively functioning free trade areas. Then peak external 
tariffs should be capped at the regional level, in a coordinated manner, to remove the 
largest distortions in the trade regime. In the same coordinated manner, but not necessarily 
under a CET, the average of external tariffs should be lowered to pursue global 
competitiveness and integration into global market. Such a strategy was an important 
feature of the development of the fast growing countries of the past 20 years. Lower tariffs 
allow domestic firms access to needed inputs at closer to world market prices and reduce 
bias against exports and the bottling up of resources into low productivity activities.  Only 
subsequently, should tariffs against imports from the EU be removed. It is essential that 
preferences for EU suppliers are only implemented after the reduction of MFN tariffs since 
lack of competition among EU suppliers in small African markets could lead to unchanged 
prices and simply to a transfer of revenue from the customs authority in the African 
country to EU suppliers.  
 
5.2 Lowering the costs of backbone services and trading 
Trade-related services throughout Africa are less efficient than in other regions. In Sub-
Saharan Africa, 52 percent of firms report unreliable electricity supply as a constraint. This 
compares to 42 percent in South Asia and 24 percent in East Asia and Latin America 
(World Development Report 2005) The Diagnostic Trade Integration Studies undertaken 
under the Integrated Framework
16 for most countries in Africa, highlight that electricity, 
                                                 
15 How this should best be done in the agreements, is still an open issue. The CARIFORIM-EC EPA makes 
reference to coordination in most chapters of the text but CARIFORUM reserves their right to sovereignty of 
related decisions, showing the reluctance of these ACP countries to commit to a predetermined pace of 
regional integration. 
16 www.integratedframework.org 
  16telecommunications, transport, and water charges are often higher in low-income countries 
and that access to these and other services, such as financial services, are extremely 
limited.  
 
Regional integration can be an important mechanism to address these problems and will be 
effective when incorporated into a broad strategy encompassing appropriate multilateral 
and unilateral reform. The domestic markets of many African countries are too small to 
realize full economies of scale in network services and their regulation. In addition, 
regional approaches can led to more effective regulatory frameworks that allow for greater 
competition, with positive effects on prices and efficiency. EPAs offer the opportunity to 
bring all relevant stakeholders together and to lock in domestic reforms and regional 
integration with regard to the regulation and supply of crucial telecommunication, 
electricity, water, and financial services needed for exporting. Regional integration must 
coupled with phased programs of services liberalization on an MFN basis to avoid the 
enlargement and entrenchment of existing monopolies or their transfer to local or EU 
suppliers. In practice, the positive economy wide impacts on employment that emerge as 
firms elsewhere in the economy expand as the costs of their services inputs decline and 
their competitiveness improves will considerably outweigh the employment impact on 
incumbent service providers as markets are opened up to competition.  
 
The potential for African countries to expand regional and global exports by lowering trade 
costs other than policy border barriers is enormous. The costs of institutional obstacles, 
informal barriers and sub-optimal regulatory scales are often high and, unlike tariffs, do 
not generate revenues but simply waste economic resources and dampen productivity.  
Regional agreements can precipitate effective cooperation to lower these trading costs by 
raising the level of policy salience, dispersing information, ensuring better coordination 
between the institutions of different countries, providing an institutional home for joint 
initiatives and by facilitating both informal and formal dispute resolution. Trade in Africa 
remains dogged by lack of coordination and weak harmonization of documentation and 
regulations. Finally, negotiating these backbone services in a regional forum can act to 
depoliticize issues. Again, aid for trade will be needed to address the large investment 
demands that will address problems in regional infrastructure networks within each region. 
 
Reforms that will increase access to crucial backbone services should also aim at 
establishing simple but functioning, region-wide, approached to competition policy. 
Linking EPAs to small but firm commitments on establishing a supra-national competition 
policy within each EPA region could help to advance policy reforms. Due to the extensive 
experience of the EU with the establishment of a supra-national competition policy, the EU 
should consider offering aid for trade in this area, in particular in the form of technical 
assistance and twinning.  
 
5.3 Pro-active policies to support trade 
While integrating into the world economy requires that import taxes are low and relatively 
uniform, for the least developed countries they are often a key source of revenue relative to 
VAT and sales taxes (Figure 7). High-income countries are able to recover revenues lost 
from trade liberalization from other sources: on average, middle income countries recover 
  1745-60 percent of lost tariff revenues while least developed countries recover less than 30 
percent of lost tariff revenues (Baunsgaard and Keen 2005). Concern over this revenue 
issue is an important factor constraining low income countries in reforming external tariffs 
to reduce bias against exporting and a better structure of incentives for global integration.  


























VAT, sales, or turnover taxes
Source: Bank staff calculations 
 
But many countries collect far less in tariff revenue than the applied tax rates would 
suggest, due to the widespread (discretionary) granting of exemptions. Analysis for a 
number of ESA countries suggests that a large share of statutory customs revenues is not 
actually collected, such that the revenue impact of tariff reform will be considerably less 
than would be expected on the basis of statutory tariff rates (Brenton, Hoppe and von 
Uexkull (2007)). For example, a simulation of the impact of an EPA for Ethiopia suggests 
a revenue loss of 3.4 percent of total tax revenues when actually applied tariffs are used but 
a loss of 6.4 percent if the statutory tariff rates are used. If Ethiopia were to remove tariff 
exemptions as tariffs against the EU were removed then the simulated revenue loss would 
amount to 0.8 percent of total tax revenues.  
 
Exemptions make the tax regime opaque and difficult to administer and can lead to a 
distorted incentive structure that discriminates against small firms with less influence. 
Further, there is little evidence that exemptions have a significant impact on investment, 
their primary justification. Many countries could substantially reduce applied tariffs while 
maintaining or even increasing revenue if exemptions were removed and collection 
improved. However, it is still necessary to address the development challenge highlighted 
in Figure 7 of moving from easy-to-collect trade taxes to harder-to-collect consumption 
and income taxes. Simply implementing a VAT is not sufficient; a high degree of 
collection efficiency (the ratio of actual to potential revenues) is needed.  
 
To meet this development challenge and obtain the necessary funds to finance relevant 
projects requires an increase in the tax base for the “difficult to collect taxes” which will be 
achieved through economic growth, simplification, in terms of fewer rates and less 
exemptions, an increase size of formal relative to informal sector and through improved 
  18revenue collection. A key objective for many of the African countries is customs reform to 
increase the efficiency of collection of taxes applied at the border. This in turn requires 
initiatives to raise the capacity of customs.
17  Regional reform and harmonization of tax 
administration and structures will promote regional integration and help replace lost tariff 
revenue. It will furthermore simplify and streamline the regional incentive regime if done 
properly.  
 
Exporters in African countries tend to face common problems in accessing new markets 
and so coordinated responses at the regional level facilitated by an EPA could be 
instrumental in addressing the associated market and policy failures. For example, weak 
institutions regarding testing and conformity assessment may hamper development and 
export of new products or higher quality variants of existing exports. The ability of would-
be exporters to comply with mandatory health and safety standards, as well as market-
driven voluntary standards in overseas markets, is a major factor determining access to 
those markets. Upgrading testing facilities and measuring equipment is essential for 
reducing the costs of conformity assessments. EPAs can contribute to alleviating these 
problems by leveraging regional approaches that provide more efficient and effective 
standards and conformity assessment systems and thereby providing a framework through 
which aid for trade can be delivered to support improved competitiveness. 
 
Box 1: Elements of a Pro-Development EPA 
 
What does a pro-development EPA look like?  Here are 8 elements that would collectively constitute 
central tenants of a pro-development EPA.  A guiding principle of these measures is that all 8 are in the 
fundamental interest of all countries as part of their development strategies—and of the EU in its 
objective of promoting development.  These would include: 
 
1.  A program of phased and variable geometry for MFN reductions in external tariffs, consistent with 
regional development programs.  For example: 
Phases 1 and 2: Eliminate all internal tariff barriers in CU/FTA to promote regional trade.  
  Phases 1 and 2: Bring down MFN peak tariffs to average to promote intra-African and other 
efficient trade with third parties.  
  Phases 2 and 3: Bring down MFN average levels toward East Asian levels in EPA group. 
Phase 3:  Allow preferential for the EU; taken as a final step, the adverse risks of trade   
  diversion and hub-and-spokes development would be lessened. 
 
2.  Nonrestrictive rules of origin for ACP access to the EU market (choice of satisfying either a 10% 
value-added requirement or change of tariff heading); if the value-added requirement is higher, 
cumulation should cover all developing countries to allow ACP producers maximum access to the 
world’s lowest-cost inputs and to avoid putting regional suppliers outside the EPA group at a 
disadvantage.  
 
3.  A program of gradual but purposeful reforms of tax administration and intra-regional tax policy to 
harmonize tax structures so as to promote regional integration and replace lost tariff revenues.  This 
can complement tariff and customs reforms at the regional level.  
 
                                                 
17 The EU could support ACP countries by including a mechanism for temporary staff exchange and a 
knowledge transfer program. These types of initiatives could also be useful in providing incentives for 
certain of the LDCs to come to the negotiating table. 
  194.  A phased, region-specific program of services liberalization designed to promote wider access to 
lower cost trade-related services, such as efficient telecommunications, electricity, and transport; 
this should be undertaken on an MFN basis, so as to avoid entrenching monopolies from one or 
another country. 
 
5.  A program of trade facilitation measures—for example, improvements in customs, ports, border 
posts -- to reduce costs, linked to intra-regional programs to lower costs of trading, with special 
attention to lowering transit costs of land-locked countries, with specific benchmarks for 
implementation;  
 
6.  A program, however small, of temporary movement of persons (mode 4); while not currently in the 
negotiations, this may be easier to achieve in regional arrangements than in multilateral talks.   
 
7.  Agreements could include new IPR rules and rules on investment, but these should be back-loaded 
and phased in accordance to a region’s capacity to implement – and to benefit from them.  
Agreements could include adoption of competition policies consistent with national development 
strategies and in accordance with a region’s capacity to implement and benefit from them.  
 
8.  “Aid for trade” in the form of a program of technical and financial assistance to support 
competitiveness reform programs through funding projects that improve trade facilitation, 
conformity with SPS and TBT measures, alleviate supply side constraints (e.g., infrastructure) and 
increase administrative capacity in key policy areas (such as tax administration), as well as funding 
programs that address the adjustment costs that arise from trade reform.   
 
Derived from Hinkle, Hoppe, and Newfarmer (2005) 
 
Successful implementation of the bold reform programs required for African countries to 
be able to integrate effectively into the global economy will typically require measures to 
limit the adjustment costs that will arise. Assistance to firms and workers can both speed 
the adjustment process and reduce adjustment costs.
18 It is important to get the balance 
right between assisting firms in previously protected sectors that have long-term viability 
and supporting resources moving into new high growth/high productivity internationally 
competitive sectors.  
 
Inter-sectoral adjustment is inevitable and necessary to allow new sectors to grow. For 
labor, costs arise from (i) finding and taking up a new job – which can be reduced by 
projects that improve the availability of information on new jobs, support job fairs, and 
more generally build a bridge between employers and the unemployed; (ii) loss of income 
during the period of transition – which can be addressed through a social safety net, for 
example, in the form of social security and unemployment benefits; (iii) the costs of 
retraining and preparing for work in new sectors – which can be addressed through 
subsidized training programs, apprenticeship schemes and so on. In general these 
adjustment costs tend to be lower in more flexibility labor markets.  
 
Similarly, reforms that aim at improving the education infrastructure and quality, in 
particular at the vocational level, should be undertaken as part of the pro-active policies to 
support trade reform. For two reasons, it will be important to focus on portable skills that 
                                                 
18 For more details on the costs associated with trade reform see Bacchetta and Jansen (2003) and Cordoba et 
al (2005).  
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“destroyed” in a dynamic economic environment with high job turnover, and b) because 
private companies are less likely to invest in portable skills of their workers—as compared 
to specific skills—due to the fear of the workers being competed away. Well-designed and 
productivity improving support measures that address the vocational education 
infrastructure could possibly form part of the comprehensive reforms driven by EPAs with  
some financial support from the EU and other development partners. 
 
Helping selected firms – notably the most productive -- in the declining sectors to increase 
competitiveness may allow them to survive after liberalization, hence maintaining some 
output and employment in the sector. The costs of such intra-sectoral adjustment tend to be 
smaller than those that arise when resources need to move into new sectors reducing 
overall cost of trade reform. This often requires investment in new production techniques 
and repositioning of the firm’s product on the market through upgrading quality and 
exploit specific market niches. Initiatives to support such adjustment by existing firms has 
to first address the issue of why viable firms have not already made the investments. 
It may be that trade protection and/or government regulation (including price controls) may 
have dissuaded investment in the most efficient technologies, so hat trade reform itself is 
the key part of the upgrading process. Nevertheless, there are also likely to be specific 
market failures that limit adjustment possibilities, such as, lack of a functioning credit 
market, lack of a market in technical advice and in support for marketing. When long-term 
survival is based upon exporting, adjusting firms will need to make new (and different) 
investments and incur start-up costs relating to issues such as market information and 
product redesign to satisfy the standards of different markets. Aid for trade under the EPAs 
can address the institutional weaknesses and financial constraints that limit the ability of 
African countries to address these adjustment costs.   
 
The focus here has been on the ways in which African countries can leverage an EPA to 
address the critical constraints to competitiveness and growth. Many of these issues need 
to be dealt with regardless of whether an EPA is signed or not. Indeed, it is essential that 
an EPA be integrated into a broad strategy towards competitiveness that motivates 
unilateral actions for reform as well as those that are locked in through regional and 
multilateral agreements. For example, as discussed earlier, it is vital that African countries 
reduce their external tariffs since open regions have performed much better than those 
closed to the global economy. Preferential trade agreements are only effective for 
developing countries if implemented in conjunction with more comprehensive domestic 
reforms. At the same time, a successful trade agreement will contribute to the overall 
economic impact of that reform program. In Europe, the eight Central and Eastern 
European countries that joined the EU in 2005 experienced strong growth in trade and 
investment inflows during the 1990s; yet two countries in the region, Bulgaria and 
Romania, having almost identical trade agreements with the EU but initially much less 
extensive domestic reform programs, saw a much weaker trade and investment response. 
Regional integration initiatives in Latin America in the 1990s have been much more 
effective than early efforts, reflecting broad and credible reforms in many countries 
(Devlin and French-Davis (1999)). Successful countries in the region such as Chile have 
effectively pursued improved market access in the major overseas market, the US, as well 




Both the EU and the ACP countries will have to work hard to build upon the initial 
momentum generated by the interim agreements to achieve pro-development EPAs. Key 
issues must be addressed to avoid the risks that come from the interim agreements that 
have been initialed by many African countries. Because external tariffs are relatively high 
and internal barriers within groupings still prevalent, enacting the provisions of the interim 
agreements on reciprocal tariff reduction in African countries without prior action on these 
issues could result in a hub and spoke pattern of trade integration, trade diversion, and the 
possibility of net losses of income. Without action on external and internal barriers, giving 
EU firms preferential access could well divert trade to EU-producers from more efficient 
producers based in the rest of the world and even from those based in the regional 
grouping if the internal non-tariff barriers exceed the external tariff. As a result, trade 
liberalization vis-à-vis the EU might not lead to lower consumer prices but rather to a 
transfer of tariff revenue to EU producers. This problem is aggravated by the fact that 
many national markets in Africa are small and transport costs to these markets can be high. 
Markets are often monopolized by one external supplier and competition among EU 
producers is not likely to increase after the implementation of the EPAs. Thus, an EPA 
focused on preferential tariff removal for EU suppliers that is implemented in the absence 
of a strategy to raise competitiveness in Africa through reductions in internal and external 
barriers to trade, attention to supply side constraints such as lack of infrastructure, and 
active policies to support trade and address trade related adjustment costs, will likely 
undermine development.  
 
To achieve pro-development EPAs, the EU should go further in reducing the 
restrictiveness of its rules of origin, defer its own preferences in ACP markets until 
important MFN liberalization has occurred in the regions and to support ACP countries 
implement their reform programs through “aid for trade”.  African countries should focus 
on developing regional strategies for integration that harness the potential power of the 
EPA process to move forward on reforms that will promote their competitiveness, 
integration, and growth and be willing to lock-in a program of implementation consistent 
with their own development priorities and pace of reform. The new phase of the EPA 
process that will follow the initialing of the interim agreements provides an opportunity, 
through a more realistic approach to variable geometry, to connect the negotiations more 
closely to national trade and development strategies.  
  22References 
Bacchetta, M and M Jansen (2003) ‘Adjusting to Trade Liberalisation: The Role of Policy, 
Institutions and WTO Disciplines’, WTO Special Study 7, WTO, Geneva 
Baunsgaard, T and Keen, M (2005), “Tax Revenue and (or?) Trade Liberalization”, IMF 
Working Paper WP/05/112, International Monetary Fund, Washington DC. 
Brenton, P and Ikezuki, T (2005) ‘The Value of Trade Preferences for Africa’, in 
Newfarmer, R (ed) Trade, Doha and Development: A Window on the Issues, World Bank, 
Washington DC. 
Brenton, P and Hoppe, M (2007), “Clothing and Export Diversification: Still a Route to 
Growth for Low Income Countries?”, Policy Research Working Paper 4343, World Bank. 
Brenton, P and Ozden, C (2007) ‘The Effectiveness of the EU and US Trade Preferences 
for Least Developed Countries with a Focus on the Rules of Origin in the Clothing Sector’, 
in Gerrit Faber and Jan Orbie (eds) European Union Trade Politics and Development: 
‘Everything but Arms’ Unravelled, Routledge, London 
Brenton, P, Hoppe, M and E von Uexkull (2007) ‘Evaluating the Revenue Effects of Trade 
Policy Options for COMESA Countries: the Impacts of a Customs Union and an EPA with 
the European Union’, World Bank Washington 
Brenton, P, Newfarmer, R and P. Walkenhorst (2007) ‘Export Diversification: A Policy 
Portfolio Approach’, paper presented to the Growth Commission Conference on 
Development, Yale University, mimeo, World Bank 
Broadman, H (2007) Africa’s Silk Road, Washington, World Bank. 
Busse, M., Borrmann, A., and H. Großmann (2004), The Impact of ACP/EU Economic 
Partnership Agreements on ECOWAS Countries: An Empirical Analysis of the Trade and 
Budget Effects, Final Report, HWWA, Hamburg. 
Cline, W (2006), “Exports of Manufactures and Economic Growth: The Fallacy of 
Composition Revisited.” Institute for International Economics, Washington DC. 
Cordoba, S., S. Laird and J.M Serena (2005) ‘Adjusting to Trade Reforms’, UNCTAD, 
Geneva 
Devlin, R and R. French-Davis (1999) “Towards an Evaluation of Regional Integration in 
Latin America in the 1990s’, The World Economy, 22, 261-90 
Eifert, Ben, A. Gelb, and V. Ramachandran, 2005. “Business Environment and 
Comparative Advantage in Africa: Evidence from the Investment Climate Data”, The 
World Bank, Washington DC. 
  23Hinkle, L.. M. Hoppe, and R. Newfarmer 2005  “Beyond  Cotonou: Economic Partnership 
Agreements in Trade , Doha, and Development: A Window into the Issues  R. Newfarmer 
(ed)  Washington: World Bank. 
Hoppe, M (2007), Economic Partnership Agreements: Does Preferential Access of Non-
LDC African Countries Increase?, Trade Note No. 32, World Bank, Washington, DC. 
Karingi, S.,  R. Lang, N. Oulmane, R. Perez, M. Sadni Jallab and H. Ben Hammouda 
(2005) ‘Economic and welfare impacts of the EU-Africa Economic Partnership 
Agreement’, African Trade Policy Centre (ATPC), work in progress n 10, United Nations 
Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) 
Keck A. and R. Piermartini (2008) ‘The Impact of Economic Partnership Agreements in 
Countries of the Southern African Development Community’, Journal of African 
Economies 2008 17(1):85-130 
Milner, C., O. Morrissey and A McKay (2005) ‘Some Simple Analytics of the Trade and 
Welfare Effects of Economic Partnership Agreements’, Journal of African Economies,14, 
327–58  
Ozden, C. and Olarreaga, M. (2005) “AGOA and Apparel: Who Captures the Tariff Rent 
in the Presence of Preferential Market Access?”, World Economy 28:63-77. 
Stevens, Chris (2005) ‘Economic Partnership Agreements and African integration: a help 
or a hindrance?’, ODI, London, 
http://www.odi.org.uk/iedg/Projects/chris_stevens/CSEPAs_SSA-Web.pdf 
Stevens, C, M. Meyn, J. Kennan, S. Bilal, C. Braun-Munzinger, F. Jerosch, D. Makhan and 
F. Rampa (2008) ‚The New EPAs: comparative analysis of their content and the challenges 
for 2008, joint ODI-ECDPM report, 
http://www.odi.org.uk/iedg/Projects/0708010_The_new_EPAs.html 
World Bank,  Global Economic Prospects, 2007: Managing the Next Wave of 
Globalisation    Washington: World Bank, 2006. 




The current value of preferences in the EU market 
EU trade preferences for the 13 non-LDCs in Africa amounted to only 3.9 percent of their 
exports to the EU or EUR 782 million in 2005.
20 The value of preferences for all African 
LDCs is much less at 2.1 percent of total exports, although this is less relevant to our 
discussions of the EPAs since these countries will continue to have duty and quota free 
access to the EU market under Everything but Arms. However, market access under EBA 
is less secure than would be provided by an EPA and the opportunity to obtain less 
restrictive rules of origin than the GSP would be lost (EBA is a special form of GSP).
21 
 
One of the problems that one faces when talking about the value of preferences is that this 
is an artificial concept. It summarises the amount of import duties that exporters did not 
pay because of preferential tariff rates; it is the volume of trade multiplied by the 
difference between MFN and preferential tariffs, taking utilization rates into account. Its 
calculation is based on actually observed trade flows and omits the fact that some of these 
trade flows might only take place because of the preferences. In that case, the whole export 
value would be additional value that is transferred to the exporter because preferences are 
granted. 
 
At the same time, the data do not allow us to identify the economic agents that actually 
benefit from the preferential rates. The issue is that tariffs create a wedge between the 
producer price in the exporting country (including transport costs to the export market) and 
the consumer price in the importing country. Here, we assume that the exporter actually 
receives a net transfer of the value of preferences. However, if there is little competition 
amongst the importers, the price received by the producers in the exporting country may 
not change and the importer or intermediary may obtain the rents generated by the 
preferences. The ‘value of preferences’ is hence a high estimate for the value that is 
transferred to the exporting country given the observed trade patterns (Olarreaga and 
Ozden 2005).  
 
Given the increasing dominance of large supermarket chains in certain sectors it is 
probably fair to assume that for a range of products a large share of the value of 
preferences will accrue to the importers rather than to the relatively large number of small 
producers in developing countries. The question then remains whether the preferences 
actually create trade relationships that otherwise would not have taken place. This more 
global value of preferences is impossible to estimate without specific knowledge of export 
prices from a larger number of suppliers and the final sales prices.  
                                                 
19 This appendix builds on Hoppe (2007), Economic Partnership Agreements: Does Preferential Access of 
Non-LDC African Countries Increase?, Trade Note No. 32, World Bank, Washington, DC. 
20 We use a new dataset the EU has recently made available. Assuming that Cotonou preferences expire and 
no new preferences will be in place by that time, 2008, it is possible that these countries would only have 
access to preferences under the GSP. Other things equal, this would reduce the value of their preferences to 
0.5 percent of their exports or EUR 103 million, a loss of EUR 679.  
21 The value of EBA preferences for all LDCs equals 3.8 percent of their exports. The value of ACP/GSP 
preferences for all African countries (excluding South Africa) equals 2.6 (3.3) percent of their respective 
exports. South Africa accounts for about a third of all SSA exports to the EU. 
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Figure1: Preferences as share of total 
exports
















note: all values in EUR1000, calculation of preferences takes current utilization rates into account 
Source: COMEXT, EU preference data, TRAINS, own calculations 
Overall, actually claimed preferences for all 13 sub-Saharan non-LDCs
22 represent 3.9 
percent of their exports to the EU. If only GSP preferences were available, this value 
would fall to 0.5 percent of total exports or EUR 103 million, a loss of EUR 679. The fall 
would be substantial for all countries but particularly high in the case of Mauritius, the 
Seychelles, and Swaziland where the value of preferences would fall from about 23, 16, 
and 50 percent respectively to nearly zero.  
 
The actual value of preferences under an EPA, however, would depend on the rules of 
origin that were to be agreed. If EPAs with Cotonou-type rules of origin were to be in 
place by 2008, the value of preferences for the 13 non-LDC countries could increase to 4.5 
percent of exports, a notional gain of EUR 107 million, assuming identical utilization rates 
of preferences as under the current regime. Inclusion of non-restrictive rules of origin in 
EPAs could increase that value to 5.2 percent assuming constant trade flows. This is a 
simple estimate calculated on the assumption that current utilization rates for existing 
exports would increase under less restrictive rules of origin. However, this is likely to 
                                                 
22 South Africa is not included in the analysis as it is only an ACP country since 1998 and is not a signatory 
to the commercial provisions of the Cotonou Agreement, which foresees the negotiation of EPAs. While 
South Africa has signed an FTA with the EU in 1999, its partners in the customs union (SACU) are supposed 
to sign an EPA. Both arrangements are likely to create barriers within SACU. South Africa’s demand to join 
the SADC EPA has long been rejected by the EU but South Africa is now taking part in the negotiations.  
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substantially understate the positive impact on trade of more development friendly rules of 
origin. Non-restrictive rules of origin such as the 10% value-added rule proposed by the 
Blair commission or a simple change of tariff heading rule would likely open up a range of 
new export opportunities for beneficiary countries, such as in clothing.  
 
The importance of preferences also differs strongly by country, mainly due to differences 
in the composition of exports to the EU. For example, the ratio of actually claimed 
preferences to exports ranges from 0.1 percent for Nigeria, which mainly exports oil to the 
EU, to 49.5 percent for Swaziland, which mainly exports sugar to the EU, a product 
subject to very large margins of preference (see Figure A1). These products are in 
particular sugar (36 percent of preference value), edible fruits and nuts (12 percent), and 
preparations of meat, fish or crustaceans (12 percent). Continuing multilateral 
liberalization from a successful Doha round would reduce MFN tariffs and reduce the 
value of preferences on exports to the EU. A rule of thumb puts the costs of proving 
conformity with the rules of origin at three percent of the goods value. If one deducts these 
costs from the value of preferences calculated, the value of preferences will be even 
smaller. When preference margins fall below three percent, usage of preferences is no 
longer likely to be worthwhile. 
 